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EXAMINING “EQUITABLE” RETENTION 
Lorna Richardson* 
 
Compensation, whereby a liquid debt reduces or extinguishes a liquid debt, is well 
understood. Similarly, retention of a sum due under a contract on the principle of mutuality 
is relatively well understood. What is less well understood is the “other type of retention”1 
or “equitable” retention which was discussed obiter by Lord Rodger in Inveresk plc v Tullis 
Russell Papermakers Ltd.2  
 
It is argued that when the legal landscape is considered in detail, compensation is a 
doctrine with a narrower scope than previously understood. Many cases described or pled 
as compensation are really cases of equitable retention.3 Equitable retention was rarely used 
by defenders prior to the decision in Inveresk. Indeed, Lord Rodger made his comments for 
fear that this type of retention would continue to be overlooked.4  Now that the existence of 
the doctrine has been highlighted it is important we understand the extent and limits of the 
doctrine and its interaction with compensation and mutuality retention. It is suggested that 
there is some commonality between mutuality retention and equitable retention, in that 
both doctrines permit a party to delay performance until compensation can take place. This 
aspect of mutuality retention has not featured prominently and, as a result, has caused 
difficulties.5 It is only when the true extent and boundaries of compensation, equitable 
retention and mutuality retention are understood that the law can develop in a coherent 
manner, free of confusion that has, to date, existed. 
 
Part A sets out a framework of this area of law including discussion of the categories 
of retention of debts. Part B considers equitable retention in detail. Finally, Part C provides 
comment on the factors identified in Part B as influencing the court’s discretion when 
considering whether equitable retention should be permitted. 
 
A The Legal Framework  
 
A crucial distinction is that which exists between compensation and retention of debts. 
Compensation operates to extinguish debts. Retention does not. Retention operates to 
suspend or delay payment only.6  
 
It has been said that compensation, like many concepts in Scots law, suffers from 
the use of inconsistent terminology.7 “Compensation” is often used synonymously with “set 
                                                        
*Senior Teaching Fellow, Edinburgh University. My sincere thanks go to Professors Laura Macgregor, 
George Gretton and Eric Clive for commenting on drafts of this paper and to Alisdair MacPherson for 
his research assistance. Any errors are my responsibility. 
1 Hume, Lectures (1786-1822) Vol III, (Stair Society Vol 15) (ed by GCH Paton, T and A Constable Ltd, 
Edinburgh, 1952) 55 
2 [2010] UKSC 19; 2010 SLT 941 
3 See discussion on pages 3 - 4. On use of the term “equitable retention” see page 5. 
4 Supra n 2 at para 77 
5 See discussion on pages 7 - 8 
6Stair, Inst 1.18.6 and 7; GJ Bell, Prin § 1410. 
7 WW McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, (3rd ed, W Green, Edinburgh, 2007), para 25-32.  
off”. “Set off” may have come into use via English law. However, “set off” denotes a wider 
principle than claims that can be set against each other in compensation in Scots law.8 As 
such “set off” will not be used in this paper.9 Another difficulty lies in the varied meanings of 
“retention”.10  In this paper “retention” is used to mean a party delaying or suspending 
fulfilment of an obligation.11 The different categories of retention of debts are set out later 
in this part. 
 
Some of the difficulties in terminology perhaps stem from the historical 
development of compensation and retention of debts in Scots law. Many consider retention 
of debts to be an extension of compensation.12 An extension of one doctrine from another 
might result in difficulties determining the boundary between the doctrines with resultant 
confusion surrounding terms. Whatever the reasons for the terminological problems this 
paper aims to identify the extent of both compensation and retention of debts, taking into 
account their distinct effects, and the dividing line between the doctrines. 
 
(1) Compensation13 
 
Compensation has been known to the law of Scotland from at least 1592 in the form of the 
Compensation Act of that year.14  
 
Compensation operates where claims are liquid15 and of the same nature - where A 
has a liquid claim against B for £100 and B has a liquid claim against A for £50 the claims can 
be set against each other so that B pays the balance of £50 to A.  In general an illiquid claim 
cannot be set off against a liquid claim.16 A pursuer with a liquid claim should be paid 
without having to await the outcome of an illiquid claim by the defender against him.17 
                                                        
8 WM Gloag, The Law of Contract (2nd ed, W Green, Edinburgh, 1929) 644 footnote 4 
9 McBryde argues that “set off” might be the better term – Contract supra n 7, para 25-33.  
10 WM Gloag and JM Irvine, Law of Rights in Security: Heritable and Moveable Including Cautionary 
Obligations (W Green, Edinburgh, 1897), 303; McBryde, ibid, para 25-34 
11 This may be until performance of a counter obligation (mutuality retention) or until compensation 
can take place (mutuality and equitable retention) – see the discussion on pages 4 and 7-8 
12 Lords Hope and Rodger in Inveresk supra n 2, paras [32] and [81]. However Bell’s Principles suggest 
there is no link between compensation and retention of debts but that retention of debts grew from 
the right to retain corporeal subjects - Bell Princ § 1410, see in particular 10th ed by Guthrie. Gloag & 
Irvine, Rights in Security, supra n 10, 303 although it is difficult to reconcile this with what is said on 
page 304. 
13 This paper considers compensation by force of law rather than contractual set off, in terms of 
which parties make express provision in their contract(s) regarding the setting of claims against each 
other. Parties might have rights under their express agreement that go beyond the extinction of liquid 
debts against each other. 
14 There is some doubt as to whether compensation was part of Scots law prior to 1592. Stair states 
that it was not, Inst 1.18.6; as does Hume, supra n 1, 28. However Bell asserts otherwise - Comm II 
126. See Lord Salvesen’s comments in Fowler v Brown 1916 SC 597 at 602 – 603. 
15 A liquid debt is a debt which is instantly due and payable. As such the sum due must be ascertained 
or immediately ascertainable. Conversely, an illiquid debt is not instantly due and payable. Indeed, an 
illiquid debt may not yet be ascertained, such as where damages are sought – the court must 
determine that damages are payable and the amount due by way of damages. 
16 Gloag & Irvine, Rights in Security, supra n 10, 304; Gloag, Contract, supra n 8, 624; Munro v 
MacDonald’s Executors (1866) 4 M 687 per the Lord President at 688; Ross v Ross (1895) 22 R 461 per 
Lord Adam at 463; Grewar v Cross (1904) 12 SLT 84 per Lord Pearson at 85; M’Connell & Reid v W&G 
Muir (1906) SLT 79 per the Lord Justice Clerk at 82; Hopkirk v Pirie 1958 SLT (Sh Ct) 9 at 9; Niven v 
Clyde Fasteners Ltd 1986 SLT 344 per Lord Jauncey at 345.   
17 Pegler v Northern Agricultural Implement and Foundry Co (Ltd) (1877) 4 R 435 per Lord Deas at 439 
Compensation must be pled and sustained.18 The doctrine is based on utility – the result of 
allowing claims to be extinguished against each other is that fewer claims have to be 
raised.19 In our example B need not raise an action against A to recover £50 due to him. It is 
also based on equitable principles20 - A should not be paid the sum due to him by B if he has 
not paid the sum he owes B. 
 
In cases decided shortly after the 1592 Act the rule that compensation only applied 
to liquid debts was strictly adhered to. In three early 17th century cases21 compensation was 
refused on the basis that the debt due to the defender by the pursuer was not liquid despite 
the defenders seeking to refer their claims for victual22 to the pursuer’s oath.23 These cases 
seem to run counter to the terms of the Act which allows debts instantly verified by writ or 
oath to be set against liquid sums claimed by the pursuer.24 By the late 1600s this stance 
relaxed and defenders’ claims that could be verified instantly by writ or oath were 
permitted.25 By the mid 1700s the practice had relaxed further with Bankton noting that 
while the Act required compensation to be instantly verified, if the pursuer took a day to 
prove his claim the defender was allowed that day to liquidate his grounds of compensation 
“even by witnesses in matters capable of that mean of proof.”26 
 
Erskine Institute’s appear to go further still stating that, 
 
our uniform practice for near a century, which seems grounded on the Roman law,.. 
if a debtor in a liquid sum shall plead compensation upon a debt due by his creditor 
to him, which requires only a short discussion to constitute it, sentence is delayed ex 
equitate against the debtor in the clear debt, that he may have an opportunity of 
making his ground of compensation according to the rule, quod statim liquidari 
potest pro jam liquid habetur.27 
 
This maxim is defined as “that which can at once be rendered liquid is held as liquid”.28 Some 
of the cases cited by Erskine29 in which this maxim was said to be operating appear to go 
beyond defenders’ claims that could at once be rendered liquid and set against the pursuers’ 
claims. The first is John Seton.30 Seton sought payment on a bond. The claim was defended 
by his debtor’s widow who claimed Seton was creditor to her husband for the freight of 
certain voyages. The court descerned against the defender but superseded extract for three 
                                                        
18 Stair stated that compensation would arise ipso jure - Inst 1.18. 6; but it is clear that is not the case 
– Sir William Maxwell of Monreith v Creditors of Sir Godfrey McCulloch (1738) Mor 2550; Bankton Inst 
1.4.23; Bell, Princ §575; Gloag, Contract, supra n 8, 644.  
19 Bell, Princ § 572; Hume, supra n 1, 28 
20 Ibid 
21 Earl of Linlithgow v Laird of Airth (1616) Mor 2564; Lady Balbengo v Lord Lauriston (1626) Mor 
2564; Campbell v Lord Kinclaiven (1626) Mor 2656 
22 Any sort of grain or corn – Watson, Bell’s Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland, (7th ed, 
Edinburgh Legal Education Trust, Edinburgh, 2012, originally published 1890), 1110 
23 There appear to have been other issues preventing the pursuer’s oath from determining the matter 
in Lady Balbengo and Campbell.  
24 Comments in the report of Ross v Magistrates of Tayne (1711) Mor 2568 suggest the 1592 Act did 
not allow claims offered instantly to be liquidated by oath to be compensated. 
25 Stuart v MacDuff (1674) Mor 2565 
26 Bankton Inst 1.4.28 
27 Erskine Inst 3.4.16 
28 J Trayner, Trayner’s Latin Maxims (4th ed, W Green, Edinburgh, 1993), 534 
29 Erskine Inst 3.4.16 
30 (1683) Mor 2566 
or four months holding that if the defender’s claim could be liquidated by that time 
compensation was to be received.31 The report notes that this decision was  
 
reversing the act, stopping a liquid debt upon an illiquid compensation; and allowing 
a term to liquidate it,… and though it be materially just, yet it is a great relaxation of 
our antient form.  
 
In the case of Brown v Elies32 the pursuer’s liquid claim arose under a bond which 
had been assigned to him. The defender pled compensation on the basis that the pursuer’s 
cedent was debtor to him. The court initially allowed Elies two weeks to liquidate his claim. 
This period was prorogated a further three weeks. A further entry to the report, which 
appears ten months after the initial report, records that the defender had been granted 
further diligence against a witness to produce writs which were to be used by Elies in 
proving compensation. It is unclear from the report whether by the date of this later entry 
decree has been granted against Elies but use of “proving compensation” in the later note 
indicates it had not.33  
 
The final case cited is Muir and Milliken v Kennedy34 in which the pursuers sought 
payment of a sum for which the defender’s father was cautioner. The defender heir, a 
minor, offered to prove that payment had been made by the principal or cautioner. A term 
was assigned to him to do so. He also pled compensation on the basis that Muir had lived 
several years in this father’s house. The court gave the defender a term in which to prove his 
compensation. The court appears to have been influenced by a number of factors – that the 
defender was a minor and heir of a cautioner; and that the pursuers were already delayed in 
obtaining decree by the defender offering to prove payment. The court noted that periods 
of time had been given in other cases to allow defenders to prove compensation where such 
“favourable circumstances” as existed in this case were absent. 
 
What is clear from these cases is that compensation was not operating in the sense 
that the pursuers’ claims were extinguished by the defenders’ claims. The defenders were 
simply given a period of time in which they did not have to pay the liquid sum until they had 
liquidated their illiquid claims. It was only when that occurred that the defenders would be 
able to compensate their claims against the pursuers’ claims. It is argued that what was 
happening in these cases, while described as compensation, was truly retention until 
compensation could take place. That these are really cases of retention receives support 
from Gloag and Irvine who deal with the views set out in Erskine’s Institutes on these cases 
as retention.35  Lord Rodger, in Inveresk, referred to the cases under the heading “early 
cases on retention for the purposes of compensation”.36 Furthermore, in a later edition of 
Erskine’s Institutes a note is added to the discussion of the cases, 
 
the granting of delay for the purposes of liquidating a debt to be afterwards the 
ground of compensation is entirely within the discretion of the Court,..37  
                                                        
31 When the court supersedes extract it pronounces decree but the extract decree in terms of which 
the decree can be enforced is delayed for a period. 
32 (1686) Mor 2566 
33 Lord Rodger, in discussing the case in Inveresk plc supra n 2, considers that decree had not been 
granted against Elies by the time of the subsequent note – para [88]. 
34 (1697) Mor 2567 
35 Gloag & Irvine, Rights in Security, supra n 10, 319.  
36 Supra n 33, paras [86] – [88].  
37 Erskine Inst 3.4.16 (8th ed), note (b) emphasis added 
 
This seems to be a situation where terminology has caused confusion. These cases 
and later cases in which defenders have sought to delay payment for a period38 are truly 
cases of equitable retention, not compensation.39 Compensation encompasses liquid debts 
against liquid debts or those which are immediately capable of being made liquid. If it would 
take the defender a period of time, even a short period, to make his claim liquid this is 
retention. It is suggested that this is where the dividing line between compensation and 
retention falls.40 
 
(2) Retention of Debts 
 
(a) Equitable or Special Retention 
 
Equitable retention may be used where A seeks payment of a liquid debt and B seeks to 
delay payment of the liquid debt on the basis of an illiquid claim he has against A. If B’s claim 
is not capable of immediately being made liquid it cannot found a plea of compensation. 
Unless B’s claim is based on the same contract or transaction41 which forms the basis of A’s 
claim against B, retention based on mutuality of contract will not be available. The general 
rule is that an illiquid claim should not delay payment of a liquid claim. However, this 
general rule is subject to exception where justice or equity so requires.42 As mentioned 
above the cases of Seton, Brown v Elies and Muir and Milliken v Kennedy43 fall within this 
category.  
 
The court exercises its equitable discretion based on the facts and circumstances of 
each case. The factors that a court will consider when exercising its discretion are examined 
in Part B. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that the general rule that illiquid claims cannot 
delay liquid claims will only be departed from in special44 or exceptional circumstances.45 
This type of retention might be described as “equitable retention” to distinguish it from 
retention based on mutuality in contract, taking account of the fact that the court is asked to 
exercise its equitable discretion. However, given the problems with terminology in this 
branch of the law it is suggested that “equitable retention” should be avoided. Retention 
                                                        
38 Such as Scottish North Eastern Railway Co v Napier (1859) 21 D 700 and Munro v MacDonald’s 
Executors (1866) 4 M 687, cited in note (b) referred to in the footnote above. 
39 Cf Gloag and Gloag and Henderson where the court’s equitable discretion to allow an illiquid claim 
to postpone decree for a liquid claim is considered under the headings of both retention and 
compensation – Gloag, Contract, supra n 8, 625 and 646; WM Gloag and RC Henderson, The Law of 
Scotland (13th ed, W Green, Edinburgh, 2012) paras 3.32 and 10.15. Wilson refers to the court’s 
discretion when discussing compensation - The Scottish Law of Debt (2nd ed, W Green/Sweet & 
Maxwell, Edinburgh, 1991), 161. McBryde considers the issue while discussing compensation but 
makes clear that there is an exceptional category of cases where the requirements of the 
Compensation Act, mutuality principle or balancing of accounts in bankruptcy do not apply – 
Contract, supra n 7, para 25.57-25.58. 
40 Lord M’Laren in Ross v Ross (1895) 22 R 461 at 464 – 465, which was cited with approval by Lord 
Rodger in Inveresk supra n 2 at paras [102] – [103].  
41 Inveresk, ibid 
42 Ross v Ross, supra n 40, especially Lord Adam at 464; Gloag & Irvine, Rights in Security, supra n 10, 
305 
43 (1683) Mor 2566; (1686) Mor 2566; (1697) Mor 2567 
44 Lord Rodger in Inveresk, supra n 2 at para [112] 
45 M’Connell & Reid v W&G Muir (1906) SLT 79 per the Lord Justice Clerk at 82; Hopkirk v Pirie 1958 
SLT (Sh Ct) 9 per Sheriff Substitute Hamilton at 9; Gloag & Irvine, Rights in Security, supra n 10, 305 
based on the mutuality principle is also equitable in nature.46 As such it is submitted that 
“special retention” should be used to distinguish between this type of retention and 
mutuality retention. “Special retention” will be used in the remainder of this paper. 
 
(b) Balancing of Accounts in Bankruptcy  
 
Where A is bankrupt or vergens ad inopiam47 B is not obliged to pay a liquid sum due to A, 
even though B’s claim against A is illiquid. This rule is based on equitable principles – to 
prevent B being forced to pay his full debt to A while B will receive only a dividend in respect 
of his debt.48  
 
There is some doubt about the effect of the rule on balancing accounts in 
bankruptcy.49 In A v B50 Lord Drummond Young opined that the balancing of accounts was 
not retention but was the setting off of one debt against the other, in the same way as 
compensation, but that on balancing accounts an illiquid claim could be set off against a 
liquid claim.51 Lord Drummond Young referred to Gloag, The Law of Contract and McBryde, 
The Law of Contract in Scotland as authorities for this view. However, Gloag refers to 
balancing of accounts in bankruptcy as the operation of the principle of retention. Gloag 
cites Lord M’Laren in Ross v Ross, 
 
The doctrine (of retention) has received much extension in cases on bankruptcy and 
insolvency, where it is practically settled that anyone who has a claim against an 
insolvent estate is entitled to keep back money which he owes to the estate, and 
cannot be compelled to pay in full while he only receives a dividend. 52 
 
In the paragraphs of McBryde cited by Lord Drummond Young reference is made to set off 
rather than compensation.53 For McBryde, set off is something wider than compensation.54 
Indeed, McBryde has discussed balancing accounts in bankruptcy as retention.55 
 
In Integrated Building Services Engineering Consultants Ltd t/a Operon v Pihl UK 
Ltd,56 Lord Hodge acknowledged the lack of consensus on this matter.57 Lord Hodge did not 
come to a concluded view but suggested that the effect of balancing accounts in bankruptcy 
was retention to allow the debtor the opportunity to make his claim against the bankrupt 
liquid which would then allow compensation to take place. He noted Lord Hope in Inveresk58 
had approved of the discussion of retention in the twelfth edition of Gloag and Henderson, 
                                                        
46 Gloag, Contract, supra n 8, 627; McNeill v Aberdeen City Council 2014 SLT 312 per Lord Drummond 
Young at para [30] 
47 Defined as “approaching to want or insolvency” - Trayner’s Latin Maxims, supra n 28, 627 
48 H Goudy, A Treatise on the Law of Bankruptcy in Scotland (4th ed, T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1914), 551  
49 It is described as “the equitable right of retention or species of set off available on insolvency” in J 
St Clair and the Hon Lord Drummond Young, The Law of Corporate Insolvency in Scotland (4th ed, W 
Green, Edinburgh, 2011), para 17-04.   
50 2003 SLT 242 
51 Ibid para [20] 
52 Gloag, Contract, supra n 8, 626.  
53 Supra n 50 at para [20]. McBryde, Contract, supra n 7, para 25-62 
54 Ibid, para 25-33 
55 McBryde, Bankruptcy, (2nd ed, W Green, Edinburgh, 1995), para 16-57 
56 [2010] CSOH 80. Lord Hodge’s decision was referred to with approval by Lord Malcolm in Joint 
Administrators of Connaught Partnerships Ltd v Perth and Kinross Council 2014 SLT 608 
57 Ibid at para [23] 
58 [2010] UKSC 19; 2010 SLT 941 
The Law of Scotland, in which the debtor of the bankrupt is entitled to withhold payment 
until his illiquid claim is ascertained.59  
 
It is suggested that this is the correct analysis of the effect of balancing accounts in 
bankruptcy,60 according with Goudy’s distinction between compensation proper on the one 
hand, and compensation as retention on the other.61  
 
While some consider the balancing of accounts as part of special retention62 it is 
argued that they are distinct categories within the doctrine of retention of debts, both 
resulting from equitable considerations.63 
 
(c) Retention of Debts based on Mutuality in Contract 
 
This might be described as the better known category of retention. This principle is based on 
the premise that a party to a contract (A) cannot seek performance from the other party (B) 
until A is himself ready to perform his obligations under the contract.64  
 
For B to be able to retain performance he will have to show that the obligation 
withheld is the counterpart of the obligation which A has failed to perform.65 There is a 
presumption that obligations undertaken by parties in a contract are counterparts of each 
other but that presumption can be rebutted where it is shown that the obligations, on an 
analysis of the contract, are interdependent of each other. 66 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
held in Inveresk67 obligations need not be contained in the same contract to be counterparts 
of each other - this can happen where one or more contracts make up one transaction such 
that A’s obligations in one contract are the counterpart of B’s obligations in another related 
contract. The unity of the transaction is to be respected.68 It appears that the breach of 
contract by A would also have to be material for B to retain performance, although the 
breach need not be so material as would justify B rescinding.69 Here the qualification 
“material” is being used in two different senses. For B to rescind the breach must be 
material. For B to retain performance A’s breach must be material, but not as severe as the 
material breach that would allow B to rescind. Again the potential for confusion due to 
terminology is apparent. 
 
                                                        
59 Supra n 56 at para [23] 
60 Lord Hodge considers Gloag & Irvine to present the balancing of accounts as a species of 
compensation. Gloag & Irvine do not support the view that balancing accounts operates to 
compensate debts although that may be the practical way the issue is dealt with by the creditor and 
insolvency practitioner – Gloag & Irvine, Rights in Security, supra n 10, 314-315. 
61 Goudy, Bankruptcy, supra n 48, 550 – 551. 
62 H Patrick, “Set off, related agreements and discretion: Supreme Court reverses Inveresk v Tullis 
Russell” 2010, Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 224 at 226 
63 Gloag & Henderson, The Law of Scotland, supra n 39, para 10.15  
64 McBryde, Contract, supra n 7, para 20-44 and the authorities cited there. 
65 McBryde, ibid, para 20-47; Bank of East Asia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213; Macari v Celtic 
Football Club 1999 SC 628 
66 Gloag, Contract, supra n 8, 594, Inveresk supra n 2 per Lord Hope at paras [42] and [43] 
67 ibid 
68 Inveresk, supra n 2, per Lord Hope at para [43]. 
69 McBryde expresses doubt regarding the extent of materiality required, Contract, supra n 7, para 20-
58 – 20.60; but see Inveresk, ibid, per Lord Hope at para [43] and EDI Central Ltd v National Car Parks 
Ltd 2011 SLT 75 per Lord Glennie at para [111]. 
The right to retain is often described as party B’s security for counter performance 
from party A.70 McBryde states the purpose of retention is to enforce obligations.71 It is 
argued that this is often the primary reason B will retain performance – to seek to force A to 
carry out the reciprocal obligation. However, it is suggested that mutuality retention goes 
further than that. It ensures B will not have to comply with his contractual obligation unless 
and until A performs or pays damages in lieu of performance.72 Suppose A and B agree that 
A will transport cargo for B. A transports the cargo but does so in such a way that damage is 
caused to it. A seeks payment of the freight from B. B refuses to pay – he retains payment – 
on the basis that A has breached the contract of carriage and as a result caused him loss. B 
might seek to recover the loss as a counterclaim in the action A raises for payment or raise a 
separate action against A to recover his loss. On the basis of mutuality retention B does not 
have to pay the freight until his claim against A has been determined. When that happens 
B’s illiquid claim in damages becomes liquid and as such can be compensated against A’s 
claim for freight.73 B’s right to retain exists so long as A’s breach persists.74 On damages 
being paid A’s breach is made good such that B’s retention is no longer justified.  
 
It is in this respect that mutuality retention performs the same role as special 
retention – both delay performance until compensation may take place. It was in this regard 
that Lord Rodger considered special retention might have been of assistance to Tullis Russell 
in Inveresk if the court had not found in their favour on mutuality.75 In this way the principles 
of mutuality retention and special retention have significant commonality in doctrinal and 
perhaps also in policy terms.76 The difference is that in many cases mutuality retention will 
operate to compel performance by the other contracting party such that compensation will 
not subsequently take place.77   
 
While both special retention and mutuality retention are subject to the equitable 
control of the court mutuality retention is available unless the court considers its use 
inequitable78 whereas special retention will only be available where the court considers it 
just and equitable to exercise its discretion to allow it.79 
 
(d) The Legal Framework 
 
It is suggested that the legal framework can be depicted as: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
70 Bell Princ § 1410 and recently McNeill v Aberdeen City Council, 2014 SLT 312 per Lord Drummond 
Young at paras [27], [29], [30] and [34] 
71 McBryde, Contract, supra n 7, para 20-64 
72 Gloag, Contract, supra n 8, 625; Fingland & Mitchell v Howie 1926 SC 319 per Lord Anderson at 324. 
73 Gloag & Henderson, The Law of Scotland, supra n 39, para 10.16; HL MacQueen and J Thomson, 
Contract Law in Scotland (3rd ed, Bloomsberry Professional, Hayward Heath, 2012), para 5.21.   
74 McBryde, Contract, supra n 7, para 20-47 
75 Inveresk supra n 2 at paras [108] – [112] 
76 AM Godfrey, “Mutuality, retention and set off: Inveresk plc v Tullis Russell Papersmakers Ltd” 2011 
ELR 115 at 120 argues that the doctrines have very little in common in doctrinal and policy terms. 
77 The party who withheld performance may still be able to claim damages from the contract breaker 
for losses suffered but would not have security for that claim by way of retention of performance. 
78 McNeil, supra n 70 
79 Gloag & Irvine, Rights in Security, supra n 10, 318; McBryde, Contract, supra n 7, para 25-58 
 
 
 
 
Compensation         Retention of debts 
 
Liquid claim  
v liquid claim 
 
Liquid claim v claim Balancing accounts in bankruptcy (the manner 
immediately capable  in which claims are dealt with in practice means  
of being made liquid  it closely resembles compensation)80 
     
Special retention  
 
Mutuality retention 
 
 
B Examining Special Retention 
 
Mutuality retention has been the subject of judicial and academic analysis. Far less is known 
about special retention. Indeed, until recently, special retention was in danger of being 
overlooked81 with retention of debts effectively equated with mutuality retention. However, 
there is clear authority that while the general rule is that where both parties are solvent a 
pursuer’s liquid claim will not be delayed pending resolution of the defender’s illiquid claim 
against him, where the claims do not arise from the same contract or transaction, the courts 
will allow another form of retention where equity or justice so demands. This form of 
retention – special retention - will only be allowed in exceptional or special circumstances by 
the exercise of the court’s discretion. 
 
While it is not possible to set out definitively when the court will and will not allow 
special retention it is submitted that the court will take certain factors into account. What 
these factors are and the impact they are likely to have on the exercise of the court’s 
discretion are considered in this Part. 
 
(1) Timing 
 
In general the quicker the defender’s claim will be made liquid the better chance of success 
he has with a plea of special retention. Lord Rodger refers to the fact that the defenders in 
Inveresk had raised a damages action, which had been sent to proof, as a factor that he 
would have taken into account had the court had to consider special retention.82  
 
In Stewart & Co v Dennistoun83 special retention was refused despite a damages 
action having been raised against the pursuer. The Lord President and Lord Ivory noted that 
matters might have been different if the proof in the damages action had been due to take 
place the following week or at the court’s next sitting, but the damages action was not so 
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advanced and involved inquiry into disputed facts in New Orleans and Hobson’s Bay.84 It 
would likely be quite some time before the damages claim was liquidated. In M’Connell & 
Reid v W&G Muir85 the defenders were unable to retain payment of a liquid claim due under 
a contract of sale. There was a dispute between the parties as to whether the pursuers were 
in breach of an earlier sale contract. That dispute concerned title to goods. To resolve that 
dispute an action of multiplepoinding had been raised but was sisted pending the outcome 
of another action of multiplepoinding. Given the amount of time it would likely take for the 
defenders’ claim to be determined the illiquid claim could not be said to be in the course of 
being made liquid.86 The court refused special retention for similar reasons in Niven v Clyde 
Fasteners Ltd.87  
 
In Munro v MacDonald’s Executors88 special retention89 was permitted. Munro 
sought payment of a legacy from the executors of 100 Pounds which had been bequeathed 
to him. The executors did not deny the legacy but pled it had been compensated by 
approximately 450 Pounds which had belonged to the deceased, which had been obtained 
and kept by Munro. The executors had raised an action against Munro for payment of 500 
Pounds or for an account of the money entrusted to him by the deceased. The executors’ 
action had been raised almost a week before Munro raised his action for payment of the 
legacy. The executors’ case was set down for trial the following week. The court was 
unanimous. In those circumstances the court was willing to supersede further disposal of 
Munro’s action against the executors until the outcome of the executors’ action against 
Munro was known. In Lord Curriehill’s view where an illiquid claim was in the fair course of 
being made liquid by decree at an early date and where there was no allegation of delay on 
the part of the defenders in prosecuting their claim, the court was entitled to exercise its 
discretion.90 Lord Deas commented that if the case had been in the same position as it had 
been when it was before the Lord Ordinary91 he may have refused to postpone giving 
judgment against the executors but as the circumstances were now different, with the 
executors’ case against Munro being heard the following week, he was content to supersede 
disposing of Munro’s action. 
 
Lord Deas’s comments can be contrasted with the decision in Scottish North Eastern 
Railway Co v Napier92 in which special retention was refused despite the fact that, by the 
time the appeal was heard, a proof in the defender’s action against the pursuer had taken 
place with a finding that the pursuer has caused loss to the defender. The Second Division 
was aware the parties had incurred significant expense in dealing with the action prior to the 
appeal and that the effect of their decision was effectively to throw that money away. As 
such, if they had felt able to adhere to the sheriff’s decision they would have done so but 
felt compelled to hold otherwise. The reason for the court’s decision was a simple 
application of the rule that an illiquid claim cannot delay payment of a liquid claim. The 
pursuer’s claim for transporting the defender’s goods was liquid. The defender’s claim for 
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loss resulting from another contract between the parties was illiquid. Lord Wood noted that 
the pursuer should have obtained immediate decree for the admitted claim four years 
earlier.93 At the time special retention had been permitted by the sheriff there were no 
special circumstances justifying the exercise of discretion to delay payment of the liquid 
claim pending liquidation of the defender’s claim against the pursuer. That the 
circumstances had changed with the intervening proof since the sheriff’s decision did not 
alter that outcome for the Second Division.  
 
If the defender has had a right of action against the pursuer for some time and has 
not raised proceedings to liquidate that claim the illiquid claim will not be close to becoming 
liquid. The fact the defender has delayed taking action against the pursuer will be a further 
factor against special retention being allowed. In Tait v Mackintosh94 the court held that the 
fact the defender had retained the pursuer in his service for four years was a bar to the 
defender being able to plead, as a counterclaim for the pursuer’s demand for wages, 
damages alleged to have arisen from the pursuer’s inebriety, neglect or fault in the 
discharge of his duties. This was especially so given that no complaint had been made 
regarding the pursuer’s conduct during the period of his service. It was only when the action 
for payment of wages was raised that the defender raised the issue of damages. In Mackie v 
Mackie95 the fact that the defender had had a claim against the pursuer for a considerable 
period of time which he had not sought to pursue until the pursuer’s action against him 
pointed against allowing special retention. The Lord Ordinary noted it “looks as if it has been 
raised to get out of his liability in the action [against him]”.96 
 
The court will not look favourably on a defender who pleads special retention late in 
the day, once the claim against him is well underway. Any delay by the defender in raising 
the issue, as well as seeking to prosecute his claim against the pursuer, will militate against 
the court exercising its discretion in the defender's favour. In Pegler v Northern Agricultural 
Implement and Foundry Company (Limited)97 the pursuer sought payment of sums due 
under his contract of employment. The defenders did not dispute that the sums were due 
but defended the action on the basis that the pursuer had not complied with certain 
obligations incumbent upon him as an employee.98  The action had been raised by the 
pursuer in mid March and decree was granted against the defenders by mid June. The 
defenders reclaimed. The reclaiming note99 was heard by the court in January of the 
following year. At that stage no averments had been made setting out the defenders’ claim 
against Pegler. Those averments did not appear until the defenders later amended their 
pleadings. It is not clear from the report when that happened but it was at least ten months 
after the action against them had commenced. The defenders’ action against Pegler had 
only been served about three weeks prior to the court’s opinion being delivered in the 
action raised by Pegler. The Lord President considered the defenders’ claim of retention as 
“laboring under the disadvantage that it was plainly an afterthought.”100 Lord Deas 
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commented, “a man is not to be kept out of his money by a defence got up ex post facto, 
which raises the strongest presumption that it is not well founded.”101 
 
 
(2) Whether the Defender has a Prima Facie Case Against the Pursuer 
 
The court will also look at the extent to which the defender can state his claim against the 
pursuer. The court will consider whether the defender has set out, in sufficient detail, in his 
pleadings his claim against the pursuer. This is likely to be tied to the speed of liquidating his 
claim given that a case is unlikely to proceed to proof until the parties’ pleadings are in 
order. However, case law indicates that the extent to which the defender has set out his 
claim is a separate factor, which is weighed in the exercise of judicial discretion, in coming to 
a decision on whether or not special retention will be allowed.  
 
This issue arose in Lawson v Drysdale102 where the Second Division refused to 
supersede extract,103 where damages had been found due by Drysdale to Lawson for breach 
of a partnership agreement, pending the outcome of Drysdale’s action of count and 
reckoning against Lawson. Lord Cockburn was clear that the decree for damages could not 
be stopped by “a vague general statement of claims that may be substantiated in another 
process.”104 
 
The court looks at whether the defender has a prima facie case against the 
pursuer.105  In Stewart v Dennistoun Lord Ivory remarked, “There is not even a prima facie 
case here. I cannot take a mere allegation,… as a ground for interfering with this liquid 
obligation…”106 In Logan v Stephen107 the pursuer, Stephen,108 was granted decree against 
Logan for wages due to him. Logan defended the action on the basis that Stephen, who was 
a farm grieve109 or labourer on Logan’s farm, was cautioner in an obligation owed by Logan’s 
clerk who had absconded owing money to Logan. Logan claimed to be entitled to relief from 
Stephen for losses he had sustained as a result of the clerk’s breach of obligation, for which 
Stephen was cautioner. There were difficulties with the form of the cautionary obligation, 
which required proof of rei interventus to support it, but no action to constitute the 
cautionary obligation had been taken by Logan. Ultimately Lord Fullarton was of the view 
that,  
 
whatever might ultimately be found to be the merits of the defender’s claims on the 
cautionary obligation when properly investigated, they could not, in their present 
vague form, afford a good ground of retention…110 
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Lord Cunninghame was particularly scathing of Logan’s claim against Stephen. He considered 
Logan’s illiquid claim to be “of a very unfavourable, if not an incredible aspect”.111 The court 
held that Logan should not be able to retain the wages due to Stephen pending 
determination of his claim against Stephen as cautioner. The lack of a case against the 
pursuer in the defender’s counterclaim on the face of the pleadings was a factor in the 
court’s decision in Mackie v Mackie.112 
 
(3) A Blameworthy Pursuer  
 
The factors discussed so far have focused on what the defender has or has not done. With 
this factor the court considers the pursuer’s conduct, in particular, what it is that the pursuer 
is alleged to have done that forms the basis of the defender’s claim against him. McBryde 
refers to this as the “liquid claimant [who] does not come into court with ‘clean hands.’”113 
That this is taken into account reflects the equitable nature of special retention. 
 
Perhaps the most striking example is found in Ross v Ross114 which concerned an 
action by Lady Ross against her son for payment of an annuity. The son did not deny that 
Lady Ross had a right to the annuity but denied that any part of the annuity was owed by 
him to her on the basis of a number of claims he had against her, one of which related to 
intromissions made in his estate during his minority. In respect of this claim he had raised an 
action of count reckoning and payment against Lady Ross in which he sought payment of 
£70,000.  
 
Lord Adam noted that he was very unwilling to cast any doubt on the well-
established rule that illiquid claims cannot be set off against liquid claims. However, the rule 
was not without some exceptions and there may be cases in which it was not desirable or 
necessary that immediate decree should be given. He considered this a “very exceptional 
case” due to the fact that, following Lady Ross’s intromissions with the estate over the ten 
year period during which she was her son’s tutor and with the rental value of the estate 
being £16,000 per year, the estate was left with a debit balance.  The manner in which Lady 
Ross had carried out her duties was heavily criticised.115 In the circumstances of the case 
Lord Adam did not think it would be consonant with justice to give Lady Ross immediate 
decree. Lord M’Laren considered the equitable nature of the right of retention, 
commenting, 
 
..the Lord Ordinary has rightly dealt with the plea of compensation, because that is a 
matter of statutory regulation, and the plea is confined to cases where both debts 
are liquid or capable of immediate ascertainment; but then there is  another 
principle under which one obligation may be suspended until the performance of a 
counter obligation – the principle of retention, and that, not being subject to the 
conditions of any statute, must be regarded as an equitable right to be applied by 
the Court according to the circumstances of each case as it shall arise.116 
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Lord M’Laren noted that in managing the estate on her son’s behalf Lady Ross seems to have 
wholly neglected her duty to keep clear accounts. It was unanimously held that the defender 
was able to delay paying the annuity. The court superseded disposal of the case until there 
was a change in circumstances that would allow the court to dispose of it more 
satisfactorily, presumably once a decision was available in the son’s action of count, 
reckoning and payment. 
 
It will not, of course, be every breach of duty by the pursuer which will allow the 
defender to retain payment of a liquid debt. In an earlier case117 on similar facts to Ross v 
Ross the plea by a son, based on his mother’s intromissions while tutrix, was repelled and 
the mother was able to enforce her decree for bygone annuities. It appears from the short 
case report that the mother’s intromissions while tutrix would be considered in a separate 
ongoing action but no details of that action, in particular, what she was alleged to have done 
in her dealings with the estate, are given. The court in Ross v Ross was heavily influenced by 
the extent of the apparent breaches of duty by Lady Ross. 
 
(4) Where the Principal Debtor is Deceased 
 
Some cases suggest that if the defender is sued on the basis of a debt which has been 
inherited this will be a factor taken into consideration by the court in exercising its 
discretion. This seems to have influenced the court in the cases of Seton118 and Muir and 
Milliken v Kennedy,119 discussed above. In the former case the defender was the widow of 
the pursuer’s debtor and was allowed a period of time to make her deceased’s husband’s 
claim liquid. In the latter case the defender’s position as heir of a cautioner seems to have 
been a particularly important factor in him being granted a term to prove his illiquid claim.120 
 
(5) The Basis of the Pursuer’s Claim 
 
As noted above the basis for the general rule that illiquid claims cannot delay payment of 
liquid claims is based on the principle that a creditor should not be denied a sum clearly due 
to him pending the outcome of an illiquid claim against him, although equity or justice may 
require exceptions to be made. The cases suggest that certain liquid claims may be more 
important and less liable to equitable exception than others. 
 
A factor that the court has shown itself to be influenced by is the nature of the 
pursuer’s claim. Often a pursuer will raise an action for payment of his liquid claim.121 The 
basis for that claim may be an important consideration. This is seen in Logan v Stephen, 
discussed above. As well as the problems with the defenders’ case against Stephen the fact 
that Stephen was suing for his wages influenced the court’s decision. Lord Fullerton was of 
the opinion that the defender’s claims against Stephen did not provide a good ground of 
retention against “a demand so liquid, so urgent, and even alimentary in nature, as that for 
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wages.”122 Lord Cunninghame also referred to the plainly alimentary nature of the labourer’s 
wages.123 This was also a factor influencing the court in Pegler, discussed above, with Lord 
Deas noting,  
 
[t]he wages or salary of a servant is a strong instance of the reasonableness of this 
rule [that illiquid claims should delay payment of liquid claims], for otherwise the 
servant would be indefinitely kept out of what is intended for his means of 
livelihood.124  
 
The effect of withholding payment of the pursuer’s claim was also referred to by the 
Lord President in Munro v MacDonald’s Executors who seemed to be encouraged in his 
decision that the defenders could retain the legacy sued for on the basis the pursuer was not 
“put to straits” having received a sum of money shortly before the deceased’s death, which 
sum was the subject of the defenders’ action against the pursuer.125 
 
Where the pursuer’s claim is based on unjustified enrichment the court will be more 
likely to allow retention by the defender on the basis that the remedy sought by the pursuer 
is equitable. Consequently the equity of the situation between the parties must be balanced. 
This can be contrasted with the position when special retention is sought where the 
defender has to demonstrate that equitable considerations are such that the court should 
allow an exception to the well-established rule that illiquid claims cannot be used to meet 
liquid claims. A claim based on unjustified enrichment gives the court a wider discretion to 
allow retention. This is seen in the opinions in Henderson & Co Limited v Turnbull & Co126 and 
G&A Kirkpatrick v Kirkpatrick’s Executrix.127 In the former case Lord Ardwall128 noted that the 
condictio indebiti, as an equitable remedy, would not be granted unless it clearly appeared 
to the court inequitable for the defender to keep the payment that the pursuer sought to 
recover.129 While such cases are often argued on the basis that the defender cannot seek to 
retain an illiquid claim in the face of the pursuer’s liquid claim, cases where the pursuer’s 
claim is based on unjustified enrichment deal with the operation of unjustified enrichment 
remedies rather than when special retention will be allowed and as such will not be 
considered further. 
 
(6) Where the Defender’s Claim is Close to but Falls Short of Mutuality Retention 
 
In Inveresk130 the court held that Tullis’s obligation to pay under the asset purchase 
agreement was the counterpart of certain obligations due by Inveresk under the services 
agreement which Tullis claimed Inveresk had breached. As such mutuality retention was 
available. However, Lord Rodger noted, obiter, that had the court had to consider special 
retention he would have taken into account the fact that Tullis’s damages claim related to 
breaches that were inextricably linked with the contract in terms of which Inveresk sought 
payment as a factor that might have been enough to allow special retention.131 In Countess 
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of Cawdor v Cawdor Castle (Tourism ) Ltd132 the fact that the principal claim by a former 
company director for repayment of a loan and a counterclaim relating to sums expended by 
the pursuer while she was a director were closely related influenced Lord Bracadale in 
allowing the defence of retention to proceed to a proof before answer. 
 
C Analysis of Factors 
 
(1) Analysis 
 
Having identified the factors influencing the court’s decision on whether to allow special 
retention these factors will now be analysed.  
 
If special retention is sought it is important that this is pled as early as possible 
(factor 1). This is particularly important where there is no substantive defence to the 
pursuer’s liquid claim133 because without the plea of special retention the pursuer will be 
entitled to seek summary decree.134 Special retention will likely come too late where the 
defender’s claim has existed for some time and he has done nothing to progress that claim 
against the pursuer. It is argued that it is fair that the court looks unfavourably on defenders 
who raise special retention as an afterthought rather than based on a genuine claim the 
defender has, and is in the process of taking forward, against the pursuer.  
 
The writer is aware of some anecdotal evidence of special retention being raised in a 
number of cases where banks have sought repayment of loans from borrowers. In these 
cases there is no dispute that the sums have been provided to the borrower and are due to 
be repaid. The borrower seeks to delay repayment on the basis that he has a claim against 
the bank for breach of duty which is unrelated to the loan and which often occurred some 
time ago but in respect of which no action has been taken by the borrower against the bank. 
In such a case the defender has failed to progress his claim, which is a contraindication to 
special retention being allowed. The court should allow decree to pass against the borrower 
in the absence of other factors indicating that special retention should be permitted. The 
borrower is not prevented from pursuing his claim against the bank following decree in the 
bank’s favour.135  
 
As much information as possible should be included in the pleadings about the 
defender’s case against the pursuer (factor 2). Without sufficient information the defender 
will have difficulty demonstrating his prima facie case against the pursuer. In the 
bank/borrower cases discussed above the exact breach of duty by the bank and averments 
to support it are often lacking with vague claims made by the borrower. In some cases it 
might be said that the borrower is making a “hopeless attempt to get out of a desperate 
position.”136  This further indicates that in such cases special retention should not be 
permitted. 
 
It is suggested that it is equitable to restrict special retention to a defender who is 
able to articulate his claim against the pursuer clearly. If the defender has a genuine claim it 
should be possible without too much difficultly to plead it. A defender who is unlikely to be 
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successful in his claim against the pursuer should not be able to delay the pursuer’s liquid 
claim pending his attempt to liquidate his claim.  
 
If an action is raised by a party whom the defender claims has committed a gross 
breach of duty against him this may persuade the court to allow special retention (factor 3). 
It is argued that in exercising an equitable discretion the court should take account of what it 
is the pursuer is said to have done that founds the basis of the plea of special retention. It 
should not be any breach by the pursuer that allows special retention, only grave or gross 
breaches, otherwise special retention could be pled in any case where the defender has a 
claim against the pursuer for breach of contract or some other duty owed to the defender. 
 
The cases in which the principal debtor was deceased (factor 4) might be explained 
on the basis that because the defenders were not the principal debtors and were essentially 
dealing with the affairs of another it was just and equitable that they be given a period of 
time to make the deceased’s illiquid claim liquid. A party in the defenders’ position, faced 
with court proceedings, will often not have all of the details of the deceased’s claim against 
the pursuer available and, of course, the party likely to have the information needed to 
formulate the claim against the pursuer – the deceased – is unable to provide it. A short 
period for a defender to investigate matters, particularly where the defender has only 
recently started to deal with the deceased’s affairs and may not have been able to fully 
consider matters relating to the estate, appears to be just. As such if a claim is made against 
an executor for sums due to the pursuer by the deceased, an executor, who is aware of an 
illiquid claim which the deceased had against the pursuer, might be allowed a period of time 
to investigate and make that claim liquid before being required to pay the sum due to the 
pursuer from the estate. However, it is submitted that if the executor or, indeed, the 
principal debtor while alive, delayed in seeking to liquidate the claim against the pursuer this 
will militate against special retention given the importance of timing and acting without 
delay.  
 
If the sum sued for by the pursuer is alimentary in nature or needed for the 
pursuer’s subsistence it is highly unlikely that the court will allow special retention (factor 5). 
This is a feature of many European legal systems.137 It appears fair that payments that are 
really needed by the pursuer are a contraindication to permitting special retention although 
perhaps the urgency of the pursuer’s need in the 21st century, with a welfare and benefits 
system, is less pressing than in the past.  
 
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Inveresk makes clear that the unity of a 
transaction should be respected, with all obligations in a contract being considered the 
counterparts of each other unless there is a clear indication to the contrary,138 there are 
likely to be cases where there is some concern regarding the applicability of mutuality 
retention. In such a case the defender may wish to plead both mutuality retention and 
special retention based on the inter-connectedness of the parties’ obligations (factor 6). In 
this way the defender gives himself a second basis on which to retain should the court come 
to the view that the obligation he is withholding is not the counterpart of the obligation 
breached by the pursuer. Special retention requires a plea-in-law separate to and different 
from the plea of mutuality retention. This stems from the fact that for special retention the 
defender must ask the court to exercise its discretion to allow him to retain payment. He has 
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no right to retain unless and until the court so decides. As such the plea-in-law used for 
mutuality retention is inappropriate.139  
 
 
 
 
(2) Limited Availability of Special Retention 
 
The cases stress the importance of the general rule that a party with a liquid claim should 
receive satisfaction of his claim without having to await the resolution of his debtor’s illiquid 
claim.140 The small number of cases in which special retention has been permitted testifies 
to the strength of that rule. For Lord Rodger the general rule reflected sound legal policy, 
and as such will usually be the equitable course to pursue.141 It is, however, clear that the 
rule is not without exception where justice and equity so require.  
 
The defender in cases in which a plea of special retention has been sustained has 
had to demonstrate to the court why his case is sufficiently special or exceptional to merit a 
departure from this important rule. While a court’s decision on whether or not to exercise 
its discretion to allow special retention is “always a question of circumstances, and of sound 
judicial discretion and equity”142 it is argued that there are certain factors that have clearly 
influenced the court in exercising its discretion. These factors provide a framework against 
which a court can decide whether special retention should be allowed on the facts of a 
particular case. While a decision on whether or not to allow special retention is an exercise 
of judicial discretion there are authorities that can shape the exercise of that discretion and 
will be of assistance to judges asked to consider a plea of special retention. Judges should 
look to these factors to help them make their decisions. Doing so ensures certainty and 
predictability in this area of the law.143 
 
Conclusion 
 
In seeking to determine the boundary between compensation and retention of debts in 
Scots law it is contended that compensation is a narrower principle than previously 
understood, encompassing only claims that are capable of extinguishing each other – liquid 
claims and those immediately capable of being made liquid. The concept of a wider doctrine 
of compensation, where periods of time were allowed for illiquid claims to be made 
liquid,144 is a result of lack of analysis and the use of inconsistent terminology. When 
analysed, a wider concept of compensation based on the maxim quod statim liquidari potest 
pro jam liquido habetur, is truly special retention.  
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The doctrine of retention of debts is a wider doctrine that previously understood, 
encompassing the balancing of accounts in bankruptcy, special retention and mutuality 
retention. In all of these categories payment can be withheld or retained until the 
defender’s claim is liquidated. When that occurs compensation may take place.145 It is here 
that mutuality retention and special retention operate to the same end. 
 
The court must consider each case on its own facts and circumstances in 
determining whether to exercise its discretion to allow special retention. Definitive rules 
that will apply to all cases have not been set down. However, guidance is available to 
determine whether the court will or will not exercise its discretion. The case law reveals 
certain factors that have influenced the court’s decision making. There is a backdrop of 
authorities against which to assess whether special retention should be permitted which can 
and should be referred to by a judge faced with a claim of special retention. It might be that 
over time certain categories where special retention will or will not be permitted will be 
established as has arguably occurred in relation to the court’s discretion to refuse specific 
implement.146 Of course, with specific implement the court has a discretion to refuse to 
grant the order sought whereas the court must exercise its discretion in order to allow 
special retention. In both cases the discretion will only be used in exceptional cases.147 
 
Special retention has not featured heavily in Scottish cases over the centuries. It is 
hoped that analysis of this category of retention will allow it to be used in appropriate cases. 
Contrary to Lord Rodger’s fear that special retention’s existence would continue to be 
overlooked148 that does not seem to be the case following Inveresk149 where anecdotal 
evidence suggests it is being raised relatively frequently but in many cases, it seems, 
inappropriately with the result that some see it as a defender’s charter. The case law has 
consistently emphasised the importance of the general rule that illiquid claims cannot delay 
liquid claims.150 Lord Rodger himself made this clear when he noted that the general rule 
simply reflects what is considered to be sound legal policy, is usually the equitable course to 
pursue and that he would not weaken the general rule in any way.151 It will only be in 
exceptional or special circumstances that an illiquid claim will be allowed to delay enforcing 
a liquid claim. The small number of cases where special retention has been permitted since 
the sixteenth century is testament to that.  
 
 
 
                                                        
145 As noted above another and important function of mutuality retention is to seek to force the other 
party to perform their contractual obligations. When the contracting partner performs the right to 
retain disappears and compensation will not take place.  
146 McBryde Contract, supra n 7, para 23-15; L Macgregor, “Specific performance in Scots law” in J. 
Smits, D. Haas, and G. Hesen, Specific Performance in Contract Law: National and Other Perspectives, 
(Intersentia, Antwerp, Oxford, 2008), 72 and 76; and L Macgregor and H Macqueen, “Specific 
implement, interdict and contractual performance”, 1999 ELR 239 at 240.  
147 On specific implement see McBryde, Contract, supra n 7, para 23-15; on special retention see the 
comments on pages 9 and 18 above 
148 Inveresk, supra n 2 at para [77] 
149 Supra n 2 
150 See the cases cited at n 16 
151 Supra n 2 at para [107] 
